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Legal Regime and Business’s Organizational Choice:  A Comparison of France and the 
United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
 
Abstract 
 
In a recent series of articles, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Robert W. Vishny have argued that countries whose legal systems are based on civil law 
(especially of French origin) have systematically weaker environments for business than those 
whose legal systems are based on Anglo-American common law. This paper addresses that 
argument by exploring the responsiveness of French and U.S. law to the needs of business 
enterprises during the nineteenth century, when both countries were undergoing industrialization. 
We find that contracting environment in the U.S. was in fact neither freer nor more flexible than 
that in France during this critical period.  Not only did U.S. law offer enterprises a more limited 
menu of organizational choices, but business people in the U.S. had much less ability to adapt 
the basic forms to meet their needs than their French counterparts.  Nor is there any evidence that 
American law evolved more readily in response to economic change than French law. In both 
nations, major changes in the rules governing organizational forms required the passage of new 
statutes, and governmental institutions do not seem to have worked any more expeditiously in 
the U.S. than in France to improve the menu of choices.  To the contrary, it was not until the late 
twentieth century that U.S. business obtained much the same degree of contractual freedom that 
their French counterparts had long taken for granted. 
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Legal Regime and Business’s Organizational Choice:  A Comparison of France and the 
United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
 
Although there has long been widespread agreement that the effectiveness with which 
property rights are specified and enforced matters a great deal for economic growth, this idea has 
recently been pushed in a provocative direction by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (hereafter LLSV).  According to these scholars, two 
alternative legal regimes—a common-law system based on judicial precedent and a civil-law 
system based on formal codes—emerged in Europe during the early modern period and were 
transplanted to the rest of the world through European expansionism. Reporting cross-country 
regressions for the mid-1990s, LLSV argue that the type of legal regime a country adopted at 
that time continues to affect its economic performance in dramatic ways.  They find that 
countries whose legal systems are based on civil law (especially of French origin) have 
systematically weaker environments for business than those whose legal systems are based on 
Anglo-American common law:  Common-law countries offer external suppliers of finance, 
whether shareholders or creditors, better protection than countries with legal systems based on 
French civil law.  Moreover, firms’ ability to finance their activities, whether measured by the 
ratio of stock market capitalization or debt to GNP, appears to be superior in common-law 
countries than in French civil-law countries, even controlling for the existence of protections to 
debt and equity holders and the quality of law enforcement in each country (LLSV 1997, 1998, 
and 1999). 
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LLSV’s findings touched off a heated debate that was waged primarily through 
alternative specifications for the cross-country regressions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; Mahoney 2001; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2002 
and 2003; Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard 2003; LLSV 2000; Botero, et al. 2002; Djankov, et al. 
2003).  They also gave rise to an effort to understand the apparent superiority of Anglo-
American law.1  Two main hypotheses have been offered to explain why code-based systems 
might have such inimical effects on economic growth.  The first emphasizes the relatively static 
character of this type of legal regime. Under the Anglo-American system of common law, legal 
rules can evolve in accordance with businesses’ needs.   Codes, however, are revised relatively 
infrequently and, as a result, their provisions are likely to become increasingly outmoded as the 
economy develops (Posner 1973; Priest 1977; Rubin 1977; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
2002).2 The second hypothesis is that the codes were creations of highly interventionist 
governments intent on consolidating their power over society.  Whereas the French and German 
codes were imposed by Napoleon and Bismarck respectively, English common law was shaped 
by Parliament’s struggle to limit the power of the King and so was more concerned with 
restraining government and protecting individual rights. LLSV favor this alternative and consider 
the existence of a civil code to be a proxy for bad government in the form of “an intent to build 
                                                 
1 For an excellent survey of this literature, see Beck and Levine (2003). 
2 This idea of the superior flexibility of the common law has deep roots in the literature on comparative legal 
systems (see for example, Pound 1921; Stone 1936).  It should be recognized, however, that some scholars have 
argued for the superiority of code-based regimes (Weber 1925/1954; Horn, Kötz, and Leser 1982), others have 
insisted that the differences between the two types of systems have been exaggerated or that they have diminished 
over time through a process of transplantation (Watson 1974), and still others claim that law in the French colonies 
was very different from that in France itself (Merryman 1996).  For more comprehensive treatments of Anglo-
American versus French law, see Zweigert and Kötz 1998, and Glendon, Gordon, and Carozza 1999. 
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institutions to further the power of the State” (LLSV 1999, 231-2; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; 
Botero, et al. 2002).3  
Both these explanations emphasize the different processes by which law is created and 
altered under the French and Anglo-American systems.  These are topics that cross-sectional 
analysis is poorly suited to investigate, so we pursue a more historical approach in this article.  In 
particular, we focus on France and the United States during the nineteenth century, when both 
countries were undergoing industrialization, and compare the extent to which their legal systems 
actually constrained businesses’ organizational choices. We also compare the facility with which 
French and American legal rules evolved as the economy grew and developed. 
France is an obvious case to study as it was the main producer of the codes singled out by 
LLSV for their detrimental effect on business.  We study the United States, rather than Britain, 
because like France it was a “follower” nation in the timing of its industrialization.  Moreover, 
the U.S. is a particularly appropriate case for our purposes because of its weak state, and because 
its decentralized structure of government, if anything, should have increased the flexibility of the 
common-law system relative to the civil-law codes that governed highly centralized France. An 
additional motive for focusing on the U.S. is that the most industrial of the American states were 
leaders in making corporate charters available to business enterprises, and it has generally been 
assumed that this leadership role extended to other organizational forms as well. 
If legal regimes, as opposed to specific governmental policies, really mattered for 
economic growth, then their effects should be observable over long periods of time. It therefore 
follows that, if the Anglo-American system of common-law is intrinsically superior to French 
civil law, then U.S. businesses should have faced a freer, more flexible contracting environment 
                                                 
3 This hypothesis too has a history that can be traced back at least to Friedrich A. Hayek (Hayek 1960 and 1973; 
North and Weingast 1989; Mahoney 2001). 
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than French businesses in the nineteenth century as well as at the present time.  Our research 
demonstrates, however, that the U.S. contracting environment was in fact neither freer nor more 
flexible than its French counterpart during this critical period of industrialization. Not only did 
U.S. law offer business people a more limited menu of organizational forms but the possibilities 
for adapting the basic forms to specialized needs were much greater in France than in the United 
States.  Nor is there any evidence that American law evolved more readily in response to 
economic change than French law.  On the one hand, our research suggests that the static nature 
of the French legal system has been overstated in the literature.  On the other, we find the 
common-law to be more inherently conservative than many scholars have acknowledged.  In 
both nations, major changes in the menu of available organizational forms, as well as in the rules 
governing these contracts, required the passage of new statutes.  Although understanding the 
comparative political economy of legislation is beyond the scope of this article, we show that 
there is no evidence that governmental institutions in the United States worked more 
expeditiously than those in France to improve the contracting environment in which businesses 
operated.  To the contrary, it was not until the late twentieth century that U.S. business obtained 
much the same degree of contractual freedom that their French counterparts had long taken for 
granted. 
The Corporation and Alternative Organizational Forms 
On the surface, it might appear that mid-nineteenth-century U.S. firms had a more 
favorable menu of organizational choices than French firms because they could readily adopt the 
corporate form.  In France, businesses could not organize as corporations without the (difficult-
to-obtain) approval of the government until 1867, and in fact only 642 corporations were 
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chartered between 1807 and 1867 (Freedeman 1979 and 1993, 1-9). Although initially U.S. firms 
also needed special permission (in the form of a legislative act) to organize as corporations, by 
the second quarter of the century a number of states had made it easier for firms to obtain 
charters, and by mid-century most of the leading industrial states had passed general 
incorporation laws that routinized the entire process (Evans 1948; Hurst 1970; Maier 1993; Blair 
1993).  Not surprisingly, the number of corporations formed in the United States during the first 
two-thirds of the nineteenth century was much greater than in France.  In New England, for 
example, more than 3,200 were organized between 1800 and 1843, and in excess of 3,500 
between 1844 and 1862 (Kessler 1948, 46)—that is, in this region alone more than ten times as 
many corporations were organized as in the whole of France over approximately the same 
period. 
It has generally been thought that the limited liability associated with the corporate form 
was crucial for access to broad capital markets and that the lack of a general incorporation law in 
France until 1867 was an important barrier to industrialization.  As a matter of fact, however, 
relatively few of the manufacturing corporations chartered in the U.S. during the nineteenth 
century raised funds by selling shares on the market. Although more than three thousand 
industrial corporations had been chartered in New England by 1875, the Boston market quoted 
stock prices for only about fifty. According to a contemporary survey of trading on the Boston 
exchange, manufacturing stocks generally were held by people who did not intend to sell them. 
As a result, “it was exceedingly difficult to obtain reliable quotations,” even for the region’s 
largest enterprises, because the securities rarely appeared on the market “except in stray shares or 
in the case of executors’ sales.” (Martin 1898, 126-32).  Even fewer manufacturing stocks were 
traded in New York, the nation’s primary financial market (Navin and Sears 1955; Baskin and 
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Miranti 1997). As late as 1890, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle reported financial 
information for only about fifteen industrial enterprises and quoted stock prices for less than half 
of those.   
The difficulties that French firms faced in forming corporations were not as significant as 
they are often made out to be, moreover, because the Code de Commerce offered business 
people an important alternative:  the société en commandite, or limited partnership. (In both 
France and the United States, of course, businesses could also organize as ordinary partnerships). 
A descendent of the medieval Italian commenda, the limited-partnership form was sanctioned by 
Colbert’s Ordinance of 1673 and explicitly defined and regulated by Napoleon’s Code of 1807. 
Sociétés en commandite (simples) consisted of one or more general partners, who managed the 
firm and were unlimitedly liable for its debts, and one or more special partners, whose liabilities 
were limited to their investments and who played no role in management (see Table 1). An 
important advantage of the form was that it enabled the general partners to raise funds from 
wealthy individuals who were not interested in participating actively in the business (Rivière, 
1882, 80-81; Lyon-Cahen and Renault 1924, 112-14; Howard 1932; Houpin and Bosvieux 1935, 
Vol. 1, 368; Ripert 1967, 456-58).  
These limited partnerships could take a variety of forms, and, by the third decade of the 
nineteenth century, some had even begun to issue transferable shares.  In 1830, a group of 
disgruntled shareholders challenged the legality this practice on the grounds that it was not 
explicitly permitted by the Code de Commerce.  Loosely constructing the Code’s provisions, 
both the Commercial Tribunal of Paris and, on appeal, the Royal Court upheld the practice. Over 
the next couple of decades the number of commandites par action, as these enterprises were 
called, grew rapidly until the passage of legislation in 1856 that more strictly regulated the 
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issuance of shares and strengthened stockholders’ rights with respect to the managing partners 
(Freedeman 1979).  New legislation in 1863 permitted firms with a maximum capital of 20 
million francs to organize as corporations without receiving special permission from the state.  
When the 1867 general incorporation law removed the limit on capitalization, the number of 
corporations (sociétés anonyme) grew rapidly.  Initially, corporations seem to have reduced the 
popularity of commandites simples, as well as commandites par action, but the former soon 
regained its earlier position. Between 1880 and 1913, however, the growth in the number of 
corporations (which now accounted for about 20 percent of new multiowner firms) came at the 
expense of partnerships (see Figure 1). 
As in the case of the United States, relatively few of the new corporations chartered under 
the general law (indeed, only 19 of the nearly 800 formed between 1867 and 1875) were listed 
on the official exchange. Nonetheless, French firms seem to have had readier access to national 
capital markets than their American counterparts.  Because government approval was needed to 
list a security on the Paris Bourse, the shares of many enterprises traded instead on the coulisse 
(curb market).  By 1875, there were frequent quotations for more than 300 enterprises (not 
including banks, insurance companies, and railroads).  At a time when quotations were available 
for no more than a handful of industrial firms in New York and for only about 50 in Boston, at 
least 208 of the firms whose securities were actively traded in Paris can be identified as 
manufacturing enterprises.  Many, moreover, were commandites par actions rather than 
corporations (Plache 1999; Hautcoeur 1994, ch. 2). 
Although there were attempts to introduce the commandite form into the United States 
during the early nineteenth century, the idea never took off.  New York passed an enabling 
statute in 1822, and most other states followed its example over the next decade or so.  The 
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statutes, however, were much more restrictive than the provisions of the French Code.  For 
example, all members of a limited partnership had to sign a certificate (to be filed with a 
government authority) declaring among other things the amount of their individual investment, 
so there was no possibility of issuing tradable shares.  Moreover, because the innovation did not 
fit well with the body of common-law precedent, the courts interpreted the statutes 
conservatively in ways that potentially exposed limited partners to unlimited liability.  For 
example, they tended to view any deviation from the declarations contained in the partnership 
certificate as sufficient cause to hold all of the partners unlimitedly liable for the firm’s debts, 
even partners who were innocent of error and even if the substance of the deviation was 
inconsequential (Howard 1934; Lewis 1917; Warren 1929, ch. 6).4  Not surprisingly, the form 
was comparatively rarely used. A sample of over 160 partnerships for which the R. G. Dun 
Company collected credit information in Boston during the 1840s and early 1850s included only 
two with limited partners.5 Similarly, a search by Stanley Howard of the records of five New 
Jersey counties (representing about a third of the population of the state) from the 1830s until the 
1930s yielded only about 140 limited partnerships (Howard 1934).   
Comprehensive data on business forms are not available for the U.S. for the nineteenth 
century, but Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman used the names of firms enumerated in the Census 
of Manufactures to estimate that partnerships of all kinds accounted for nearly 90 percent of 
multi-owner firms during the period 1850-1870 (Atack and Bateman 1995).  In 1900, the first 
year the Census recorded information on organizational form, 67 percent of all manufacturing 
                                                 
4 By the end of the century, a few states (mainly in the western parts of the country) had passed legislation 
protecting special partners who were not involved in the misstatement.  See Gilmore 1911, 618-19. 
5 The sample consisted of every firm on the right hand page of Massachusetts, Vol. 67, that had an entry that began 
before 1853. The records of the R. G. Dun Co. are located at Baker Library, Harvard University Graduate School of 
Business Administration. 
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establishments owned by more than one person were partnerships (including limited 
partnerships) and 29 percent were corporations, with the remaining 4 percent consisting mainly 
of cooperatives (U.S. Census Office 1902, 503).  Economy-wide counts are not available until 
after 1916, when the Internal Revenue Service  began to collect the income tax.  In 1920, there 
were approximately 314,000 corporations in the United States compared to about 241,000 
partnerships, again including limited ones.  These figures likely understate the use of 
partnerships because all corporations were required to file tax returns whereas partnerships only 
had to file if their income exceeded the threshold for the tax (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
1922, 8-10). The number of limited partnerships, however, was clearly very small—so small that 
the IRS did not bother to count them separately until 1976, at which point they constituted only 
7.0 percent of all partnerships and 2.7 percent of partnerships in the manufacturing sector ((U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service 1979, 408).  The bottom line is that multi-owner firms in the United 
States, unlike those in France, effectively had only two organizational choices during the era of 
industrialization:  ordinary partnerships or corporations.   
Flexibility within Organizational Forms in France 
Not only did French firms have a broader range of organizational choices, they also had 
considerable freedom to modify the basic forms to suit their needs. As a result, for them liability 
was essentially a continuous variable rather a dichotomous choice.  The French legal system 
even allowed members of ordinary partnerships (sociétés en nom collectif) to limit the extent of 
the risks they assumed.  Business people who organized partnerships under the terms of the Code 
were required to draft formal written agreements, the main details of which had to be registered 
with the government and published in a newspaper of record.  Because the provisions of these 
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agreements were public knowledge, partners had a great deal of freedom to specify the terms of 
their relationships.  Although many firms organized under the Code gave all partners equal rights 
and responsibilities, others added to their agreements clauses that limited the capacity of one or 
more of their members to act on behalf of the firm. So long as these clauses were published in 
the requisite journal, they were enforced by the courts.  If a partner who was not authorized to do 
so borrowed money on behalf of the firm, the firm was not obligated to repay the debt (Lyon-
Cahen and Renault 1924; Houpin and Bosvieux 1935, Vol. 1; Merle 1998).6    
There is abundant evidence that business people took advantage of this flexibility to 
control their liabilities. During the years 1832-1843, for example, 27.0 percent of the new 
partnerships that published notices of their formation in the Paris newspaper of record, the 
Gazette des tribunaux, delegated managerial authority to a subset of their members (see Table 2). 
About the same proportion (25.0 percent) required that debt instruments be signed by more than 
one member of the firm, and 7.7 percent prohibited partners from incurring any debts 
whatsoever.   As Table 2 indicates, moreover, the value of this flexibility appears to have 
increased with the number of partners.  Whereas over half of the firms (51.1 percent) with only 
two partners did not in any way restrict the ownership rights of members, only 7.6 percent of the 
firms with more than four partners had similarly permissive governance rules. 
The other organizational forms to which French business people had access were equally 
flexible.  The managing partners of a commandite, for example, could and did organize 
themselves with as much diversity as if they had been members of a simple partnership (see 
Table 3).  For example, of the 412 commandites simples in our dataset that had multiple 
managing partners, 42.7 percent imposed some kind of restriction on management, and 10.1 
                                                 
6 Contract clauses that required partners to fulfill obligations to the firm (for example, make promised infusions of 
capital) were enforceable even if they were not published. 
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percent completely prevented the managing partners from borrowing, in effect requiring the 
approval of the silent partners for the firm to take on debt. Commandite contracts could also 
require the managing partners to render accounts to the silent partners on a regular basis, and 
they could require that the managing partners pay out a minimum dividend each year (generally 
between 4 and 6 percent) to guarantee the silent partners at least a fixed return on their 
investment.  As in the case of ordinary partnerships, moreover, the value of this flexibility 
appears to have increased with the size of the firm. 
There were, of course, limits to what organizers of commandites simples could do:  at 
least one partner had to be fully liable; shares were not tradable; and the only way to replace a 
managing partner was to dissolve the firm and form a new one. The last two of these limitations 
could be overcome (without giving up any of the flexibility of the societé en nom collectif or 
commandite simple) by organizing the firm as a commandite par actions (see Table 4).  Not only 
were the shares of these ventures tradable, but shareholders could appoint a conseil de 
surveillance, or supervisory committee.  In some cases the conseil was simply a communication 
device between managers and shareholders, but in others it acted as a board of directors whose 
approval was required for important decisions, such as whether to encumber the firm. (The latter 
role became more common over time, especially after an 1856 law made the creation of a conseil 
mandatory).7  Shareholders of commandites par actions might also hold regular annual or 
biannual meetings at which they could fire the manager or change other aspects of the 
organization.  Between 1832 and 1843 there were 227 shareholder meetings that resulted in 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, the Code did not require firms to publish the articles of their contracts relating to internal policing.  
Nonetheless, information about conseils de surveillance can be gleaned from notices of amendments to contracts for 
existing commandites par action.  The conseils could range in size from three to seven members; their meetings 
could occur quarterly or be as frequent as once a week; their powers could be limited to auditing the books, or their 
approval could be required to sell assets and/or incur debts. 
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modifications to the firm.  108 of these resulted in the appointment of new managers. Organizers 
could also specify which types of shareholders could attend these assemblies and what voting 
rules would be employed—that is, whether there would be one vote per share, one vote per 
shareholder, or some intermediate scheme. In addition, they could require that managers pay 
shareholders a minimum dividend rate before profits could be used for any other purpose. 
Abuses during the boom of the 1850s moved legislators to attempt to regulate the use of 
share commandites.  In so doing, they sought to balance two contradictory goals.  On the one 
hand, they aimed to keep limited partners out of the day-to-day affairs of the firm.  On the other, 
they did not wish to give insiders (the managing partners and members of the conseil) 
unrestricted power to do as they pleased.  The 1856 law tried to resolve this dilemma by 
imposing personal liability on members of the (now mandatory) conseils if they did not perform 
their duties properly (Rivière 1882, 90).   This solution proved unsatisfactory, however, because 
shareholders were not willing to serve on such boards if they bore personal liability (Lefebvre-
Teillard 1985).  As a consequence, the general incorporation law of 1867 took a different tack.  It 
required shareholders to elect audit committees and allowed them to assume a more active role in 
the affairs of the enterprise.  At the same time, it absolved those who served on these committees 
of personal liability for the firm’s obligations (Hautcoeur, 1994, 247-8). 
Under the 1867 act, firms still had considerable freedom to determine their governance 
structures and how they would meet the requirements of the law.  Indeed, incorporators still had 
all of the choices that had been available to organizers of commandites par action, including the 
ability to distinguish different types of shares, set voting rules for stockholders, determine the 
timing of regular shareholders’ meetings (as well as the circumstances under which extraordinary 
meetings could be called), and fix a minimum level for dividends.  French business people thus 
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could obtain the advantages of incorporation without any significant loss of contractual 
flexibility. 
Lack of Flexibility in the United States 
Business people in the United States had much less ability than their French counterparts 
to modify the basic organizational forms to meet their needs.  Under Anglo-American common 
law, for instance, partnerships were defined by the relationship of the parties to each other rather 
than by the existence of a contract.  If two or more business people agreed to share the profits 
from a venture, then they were partners.  There was no requirement that they enter into a formal 
contract and no requirement that they notify the public of their relationship.  This simple 
principle had two profound consequences.  First, it meant that business people could be held by a 
court to be partners even if they had not entered into a partnership agreement and did not 
consider themselves to have formed a firm.8  Second, because partnerships were not legal entities 
under Anglo-American common law, the firm had no existence or identity that was independent 
of the people who made it up.  Each partner exercised full ownership rights and could enter into 
debt contracts that were binding on the firm without consulting the other members. Although 
business people could draw up copartnership agreements that restricted the ability of individual 
partners to contract debts on behalf of the firm, these agreements were private arrangements and 
not matters of public record.  As a consequence, they were not legally binding with respect to 
third parties who had not been given formal notice of their terms. Partners often did negotiate 
                                                 
8 This ambiguity in the law generated large amounts of litigation during the early nineteenth century, especially 
during downturns, as creditors desperately sought to collect on the obligations of failed businessmen.  Over time, 
new legal tests evolved that reduced the risk of being held liable as a partner for contracts that were not intended to 
be partnerships but involved some sharing of profits (Lamoreaux 1995). 
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such agreements, but if a member obligated the firm in violation of the partnership contract, the 
other partners were likely nonetheless to be held liable for the debt (Story 1859; Warren 1929, 
ch. 1).  As John Marshall, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, explained in Winship v. The 
Bank of the United States (30 U.S. 529 [1831]), “The articles of copartnership are . . . rarely if 
ever seen, except by the partners themselves. . . .  The trading world, with whom the company is 
in perpetual intercourse, cannot individually examine these articles, but must trust to the general 
powers contained in all partnerships.”9  
Although, in theory, a partner might seek an injunction in equity against a member of the 
firm who violated a partnership agreement, such a remedy could do little more than force the 
dissolution of the partnership and a settlement of accounts (Story 1859, 352).  This is not to say 
that such contracts were useless.  At the very least, they provided written evidence of the rules to 
which partners expected each other to adhere.  Perhaps more important, the threat of dissolution 
gave partners some ability to discipline each other’s behavior—particularly if the threat was 
made by the wealthiest member or if there was a chance that dissolution would require the 
liquidation of assets whose value outside the firm was much lower than within.10  Clearly, 
however, this method of discipline was inferior to the ability to enforce the terms of the contracts 
themselves that French businesses obtained under the Code. 
Business people in the United States could, of course, turn to the corporate form as a 
remedy for the deficiencies of partnerships.  Because all members of a corporation had limited 
                                                 
9 The courts did sanction one means of concentrating management (and the right to encumber the firm) in a 
partnership: the joint stock company.  Members of joint stock companies, however, were still fully liable for the 
enterprises’ debts in the absence of explicit contracts with creditors to the contrary, and there was considerable 
uncertainty about whether the courts would enforce all aspects of the contract (Warren 1929, 327-404; Blair 2003). 
10 The threat of dissolution, of course, could also be used by one member of a firm to hold up the others (Blair 
2003), but the possibility that the threat would result in liquidation acted as a constraint because the recalcitrant 
member would have to bear his or her full share of the costs of liquidating firm-specific assets (Lamoreaux 2003). 
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liability, stockholders did not have to negotiate special side contracts in order to protect assets 
held outside the firm.11  In addition, because the corporate form concentrated managerial 
authority in an elected board of directors, only those persons explicitly authorized by the board 
could encumber or otherwise act on behalf of the firm.  Contracts negotiated by any other 
stockholder were unenforceable (Freund 1896; Blair 2004).  
At the same time as incorporation solved some of the agency problems associated with 
partnerships, however, it also created new problems—problems that were potentially exacerbated 
by the increasingly standardized nature of the form in the United States.  During the early period 
when corporate charters could be granted only by special legislative act, their terms varied 
significantly from one enterprise to the next.  For example, some charters allowed stockholders 
one vote for each share owned, but others specified one vote per share up to some ceiling, and 
some even gave each stockholder the same vote regardless of his or her holdings. As the number 
of corporate charters increased, legislatures developed standard templates that made the 
provisions much more uniform.  The passage of general incorporation laws further reduced the 
                                                 
11 The earliest corporate charters in the United States were often silent on the issue of stockholders’ liability, 
creating considerable uncertainty that, by the second decade of the nineteenth century, was resolved by the courts in 
favor of the presumption of limited liability.  Where early charters were not silent, they sometimes explicitly denied 
stockholders this privilege.  Over time, however, limited liability came to be treated as a standard aspect of the 
corporate form, though charters for railroads and banks might still make shareholders liable up to double the par 
value of their stock (Livermore 1935; Handlin and Handlin 1945 pp. 8-17; Dodd 1954, pp. 365-437; Horwitz 1992, 
p. 94; Perkins 1994, pp. 373-76). Of course, even with limited liability stockholders of small corporations often 
found that they had to assume personal responsibility for their enterprises’ debts in order to secure loans at 
affordable rates (Woodward 1985; Forbes 1986) Nonetheless, this attribute of incorporation did resolve to an 
important degree the principal-agent problems that partners faced vis-à-vis each other by removing the possibility 
that one member of a firm could unilaterally encumber the enterprise with debts which the others might have to 
repay out of their own assets.  In a firm with limited liability, members were responsible personally only for 
obligations that they deliberately chose to assume. 
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extent of variation, so that by mid century most charters specified one-vote-per-share, majority-
rule governance (Dunlavy 2004).   
This standard governance rule was a potential source of agency problems because it 
weakened the position of minority shareholders and potentially subjected them to exploitation by 
shareholders controlling a majority of the stock. If the majority followed policies that members 
of the minority thought were wrongheaded or detrimental to their interests, in the absence of 
outright fraud there was little the latter could do but grin and bear it. Minority shareholders could 
not force a dissolution. Nor could they easily exit by selling their shares.  Indeed, in the case of 
closely held corporations, often the only buyers for their shares were the same majority 
shareholders with whom they were in conflict—a situation conducive more to extortion than to 
an equitable resolution of the problem (Hetherington and Dooley 1977; Hillman 1982; Dickinson 
1984; Mitchell 1990; Moll 2000; Lamoreaux 2004). 
Of course, voting rules that limited the power of the majority could also cause problems 
by giving minority shareholders the ability to hold up the majority (Rock and Wachter 2000; 
Blair 2004), but it is not obvious that one-vote-per-share, majority-rule governance schemes are 
always superior.  Presumably the desirability of alternative rules would vary from one firm to the 
next depending, for example, on the role played by minority shareholders in the ongoing success 
of the enterprise.  Where members of the minority contributed critical human capital, it might be 
important to give them a voice disproportionate to their shareholdings.  The competitive position 
of the Edison Electric Light Company was undermined, for example, by Thomas Edison’s 
dissatisfaction with the business strategy embraced by J. P. Morgan and other major 
stockholders. At one point, Edison waged a costly proxy battle to wrest control of company from 
Morgan, only to lose it again.  Ultimately, the company’s successor, Edison General Electric, 
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merged with the more profitable Thomson-Houston Company to form General Electric 
(McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz 1993; Carlson 1995).12  
Minority shareholders in corporations sometimes attempted to protect themselves by 
means of side contracts. As in the case of partnerships, however, these contracts were often 
unenforceable.  For example, there was a high probability that agreements that required 
shareholders’ unanimity (or even a super-majority vote) for corporate decisions would be 
overturned (Hornstein 1950 and 1953; Cary 1953; O’Neil 1953, 1958, and 1965; Gower 1956).13  
Even worse, shareholders who ignored or altered the standard governance rules in such ways 
risked being held partners and thus unlimitedly liable for their firms’ debts. As New Jersey’s 
Chancellor warned in 1852, if firms operating for all practical purposes as partnerships were 
allowed to exercise corporate privileges like limited liability, the result would be to perpetrate “a 
fraud upon the community.” In the case at issue, two shareholders held all of the stock of the 
New England Manufacturing Company, excepting four shares, “which were put in the names of 
four other persons, merely for the purpose of having a sufficient number of stockholders to 
organize the company in the manner directed by the act of incorporation.”  After incorporation, 
the two major owners continued to run their business “as before . . . , by and between themselves 
as individuals, the company not acting by its board.”  In the Chancellor’s view, the business was 
“in reality but an ordinary partnership.” Therefore, either the members of the firm “must be held 
to conduct their business as a corporation, and be governed by the law of corporations,” or they 
                                                 
12 Another similar episode involved the Edison United Phonograph Company.  Edison had assigned his 
phonographic patents to the firm in exchange for half of its stock.  Later, he found himself in disagreement with the 
policies pursued by the majority of the firm’s directors and was unable to persuade them to change course.  
Frustrated, he sued in equity to try to force the dissolution of the firm, but the court refused to intervene (Edison v. 
Edison United Phonograph Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 620 [1894]). 
13 The reader will note that these sources all date from the post-World War II period.  Even that late there was 
substantial uncertainty associated with agreements that modified the standard governance rules.  See below. 
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“should be liable to debts to the whole amount of their property” (Vandyke v. Brown, 8 N.J. Eq. 
657 [1852]). 
Although the courts would not permit stockholders to opt out of the standard corporate 
governance rules, they did usually allow stockholders to contract among themselves to exercise 
their votes in particular ways.14  For example, the courts were willing to enforce agreements 
among stockholders to vote for particular persons as directors or to place their stock in voting 
trusts whose officers in turn would choose the directors of the firm. Thus a federal court declared 
in 1867 that it was “unable to perceive anything . . . contrary to public policy, or anywise open to 
objection” in an agreement by a group of stockholders to place their shares in an irrevocable 
voting trust for a specified period of time (Brown v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 5 Blatchf. 525 
[1867]). Similarly, an Illinois court saw nothing wrong in an agreement among a majority of the 
shareholders of the Chicago Carbon and Coal Company to “determine among themselves as to 
the officers and management of the company, and that if they could not agree, they would ballot 
among themselves for the directors and officers, and that the majority should rule, and their vote 
be cast as a unit, so as to control the election” (Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 [1870]).  As this last 
example suggests, such agreements could actually worsen the situation of minority shareholders 
by making it easier for a controlling group to solidify its power.  Moreover, even when such 
contracts were employed by the minority to protect their interests, there were limits to their 
reach.  Most importantly, they could not be used to bind the directors to pursue a particular set of 
policies or elect specific people as officers.  The courts regarded such provisions as “contrary to 
                                                 
14 There were, however, some contrary decisions.  See, for example, Seitz v. Michel,148 Minn. 80 (1921):  “There is 
much authority tending to sustain plaintiff’s contention that the owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation 
may combine, either through the agency of a voting trust or by private agreement, to secure and retain control and 
ensure permanency in the management of corporate affairs.  There is nearly as much authority condemning all such 
combinations and private arrangements as contrary to public policy. 
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public policy” and would refuse to enforce them if the directors violated their terms (Guernsey v. 
Cook, 120 Mass. 501 [1876]; Cone v. Russell, N.J. Eq. 208[ 1891]; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 
313 [1918]).  
In sum, business people in the United States not only had fewer organizational choices 
than their French counterparts, they also had less freedom to modify the basic forms to suit their 
needs.  Although they sometimes attempted to compensate for this rigidity by writing side 
contracts, the case law indicates that many such agreements were often either unenforceable or 
of uncertain effect.  Because these kinds of contracts were private matters, we have no way of 
estimating their incidence, but there is little question that there were generally an inferior means 
of obtaining the flexibility that French business people obtained under the Code. 
Change over Time in Response to Industrialization 
Because French businesses had a broad range of organizational choices and could readily 
modify the basic forms to suit their needs, one would not expect industrialization to have 
generated much pressure for additional flexibility.  Changing economic conditions and periodic 
bouts of speculative excess did, however, result in repeated calls for new legislation, particularly 
reforms that would protect small investors in sociétés anonymes.  Some of these calls ultimately 
led to the passage of statutes. For example, a reform effort that began in the mid-1880s finally 
yielded an 1893 law specifying (among other provisions) that the original subscribers of a 
corporation were liable for calls on capital for two years, even if they sold off their stock, and 
that shares had to be fully paid in before they could be designated bearer shares.  But subsequent 
proposals in 1903, 1906, and 1911 failed even to get to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies for 
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a vote (Freedeman 1993; Lyon-Cahen and Renault 1924, 11; Houpin and Bosvieux 1935, Vol. 1, 
767-68).15  
French corporations were required by law to deposit financial statements with their local 
commercial tribunals.  In principle, shareholders could research these statements, but the lack of 
accounting standards meant that the information they contained could obscure as much as it 
revealed about a company’s actual condition.  Although the state increased penalties during the 
1930s for firms that did not file financial statements, it made no effort to standardize accounting 
practice or force firms to publicize their balance sheets.  Nor did the governing authority of the 
Bourse make any effort to increase transparency (Ripert 1967, Vol. 1).  Not until the wholesale 
redrafting of business law in 1966 were there substantial changes in the provision of information 
to investors in sociétés anonymes.  These reforms ushered in a period of convergence towards 
U.S. standards of corporate governance.  Indeed, the laws that created the Commission des 
Operations de Bourse and required that publicly traded corporations publish financial statements 
drew inspiration from the legislation that had set up the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the mid-1930s (Merle 1998, 553). 
Business people involved in small privately held enterprises, however, received a boost in 
1925, when the French government added a major new alternative to the menu of organizational 
forms—the limited liability company or société à responsabilité limitée (SARL).  Based on the 
model of the German Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), this option mixed 
                                                 
15 Sometimes, when problems developed that were not quickly resolved by new legislation, the French courts 
articulated their own rules, much like common-law courts in the United States.  For example, in the late nineteenth 
century they determined that acts of corporations that involved fundamental departures from the terms of their 
original charters required the unanimous approval of stockholders rather than the simple majorities sufficient for 
minor alterations.  The courts also decided what kinds of changes should be construed as fundamental, applying a 
broad definition that included most mergers until new legislation in 1913 provided a narrower standard (Freedeman 
1993). 
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attributes of corporations and partnerships.  For example, all members of an SARL had limited 
liability, but the capital was not divided into tradable shares.  The new form apparently served an 
important economic need because businesses rapidly adopted it (see Figure 2). Despite the ready 
availability of the corporate form, as late as 1920 to 1925 two-thirds of all the new multi-owner 
firms formed in France were ordinary partnerships, and three-fourths had at least one liable 
partner.  Within a few years of the passage of the new statute, the numbers had completely 
reversed.  By 1927 to 1932, fully 87 percent of all new multi-owner firms were either 
corporations or SARLs—that is, forms that granted all members limited liability. Moreover, of 
these limited-liability firms, three quarters were organized as SARLs rather than sociétés 
anonymes.16  
Intriguingly, although the limited liability company was already in widespread use in 
Great Britain, as well as in Germany, the 1925 law was not a response to pressure from the 
French business community for access to this advantageous form.  Nor was it an attempt by 
progressive policy makers to copy models that had achieved desirable results elsewhere.  Rather, 
the statute was a consequence of France’s recovery of Alsace and Loraine after the First World 
War.  These departments had been part of Germany and hence governed by German law since 
the Franco-Prussian War.  Many businesses had organized during this period as GmbHs and did 
not want to give the form up when the area returned to French control.  Instead, they campaigned 
for legislation that would make an equivalent form available throughout France.  Despite the 
measure’s subsequent popularity, the bill faced staunch opposition which delayed its passage 
                                                 
16 These figures come from annual issues of the Compte général de l’administration de la Justice Civile et 
Commerciale and include all new multi-owner firms registered in France. The results for Paris alone are similar:  
Ordinary partnerships accounted for 69 percent of new multi-owner firms in 1920-25; addition of commandites 
would increase the figure to 83 percent. For 1927-32, 87 percent of firms in Paris were either corporations or SARLs 
and of those 65 percent were SARLs. 
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until 1925 (Copper-Royer, 1925, Vol. 3, 173-74; Houpin and Bosvieux 1935, Vol. 2, 752, 753 fn 
1; Ripert 1968, 476-77). 
In the case of the United States, one might have expected businesses’ relative lack 
contractual freedom to have generated pressures for more organizational choice, but the pace of 
change was glacial until the last third of the twentieth century.  Not only did the common law fail 
to evolve in ways that increased the flexibility of the legal rules governing business 
organizations, but at times it even functioned as a barrier to statutory reform.  For example, not 
only was there no change in the rule that contracts that limited the ability of one member of a 
partnership to encumber the firm were not enforceable if creditors failed to receive advance 
notice of the restrictions, but the weight of common-law precedent derailed an effort to draft 
legislation that would have made the partnership form more flexible. During the first decade of 
the twentieth century, as part of the movement to standardize legal practice across states, the 
Conference on Uniform State Laws directed its Committee on Commercial Law to prepare a 
Uniform Partnership Act.  The Committee commissioned two drafts:  one based on common-law 
precedent; and the other on the idea, central to the French Code, that partnerships were legal 
entities.  Because the latter statute would have required partnerships to publish notice of their 
formation, it had the potential to grant American business people the same ability that their 
French colleagues enjoyed to write contracts controlling the extent of their liability.  At the start 
of the drafting process, there was overwhelming sentiment for the French approach, but in the 
end the draft based on common-law precedent prevailed.  One of the primary reasons was the 
growing realization that such a statute would “abolish much of our existing partnership law and 
substitute in its place radically different legal principles . . .” (Lewis 1915, 172)  Although 
eventually a Revised Uniform Partnership Act would declare partnerships to be legal entities, 
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this change would not occur until 1992, and even then most states would balk at accepting it 
(Hurst 1996). 
In the case of corporations, there was similarly little evolution in the courts’ attitude 
toward stockholders’ agreements that altered the standard governance rules.  Thus the New 
Jersey Appeals Court decided a key case in 1910 on much the same grounds that the state’s 
Chancellor had articulated over a half century earlier in Vandyke v. Brown.  At issue was a 
corporation organized by Walter M. Jackson and Horace E. Hooper to publish and distribute the 
Encyclopedia Britannica.  As in the earlier case, the two men had agreed between themselves to 
run the business as a partnership in which all decisions were to be made by mutual assent.  When 
they had a falling out, Jackson sued in equity to enforce the agreement.  The court turned him 
down, adamantly declaring that partnerships and corporations were different legal forms and that 
business people could not “Proteus-like” become “at will a co-partnership or a corporation, as 
the exigencies or purposes of their joint enterprise may from time to time require.” 
If the parties have the rights of partners, they have the duties and liabilities 
imposed by law, and are responsible in solido to all their creditors.  If they adopt 
the corporate form, with the corporate shield extended over them to protect them 
against personal liability, they cease to be partners, and have only the rights, 
duties, and obligations of stockholders (Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592 
[1910]). 
This rigid view of the rules of corporate governance persisted at least until the mid-twentieth 
century. As late as 1945, for example, the New York State Court of Appeals struck down a 
corporate by-law requiring stockholders’ unanimous consent for the election of directors on the 
grounds that “the State, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting their individual liabilities 
 25
for business debts by forming themselves into an entity separate and distinct from the persons 
who own it, demands in turn that the entity take a prescribed form and conduct itself, 
procedurally, according to fixed rules” (Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112 [1945]).17 
Although state legislatures passed a number of revisions to their general incorporation 
laws during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the collective effect of these 
changes at least through the first half of the twentieth century was to increase the power of 
majority shareholders over the minority.  For example, a wave of statutes enacted in the wake of 
New Jersey’s permissive 1888 law typically included provisions that reduced the ability of 
individual stockholders to block managerial decisions that fundamentally altered the business of 
the enterprise.18  As one writer put it, the result was increasingly to place the individual 
stockholder “in the position of holding a ‘pig-in-a-poke’”—to make him or her “more dependent 
with each new statute upon the desires of the management and the majority which often is only 
another name for the management” (Rutledge 1937, 312, 337; Berle and Means 1933; Dodd 
1936; Dickinson 1984).  
Stockholders also found it increasingly difficult to monitor their investments.  Although 
some early general incorporation laws (most notably New York’s widely copied 1848 statute) 
had required corporations to issue annual financial statements, reporting requirements tended to 
become laxer over time.  Indeed, by the turn of the century, except in the case of special types of 
corporations like banks, the statutes rarely included mandates to provide information on 
                                                 
17 Although some decisions (see, for example, Ripin v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442 [1912]) pointed toward 
a more flexible view of the statutory requirement, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410 (1935) was the first case to 
articulate the view that a contract among stockholders that deviated from statutory norms might be upheld so long as 
it “damaged nobody—not even, in any perceptible degree, the public.”  See Dickinson (1984). 
18 As in France, the courts tended to hold that important changes to a corporation’s charter required stockholders’ 
unanimous consent.  By the late nineteenth century, however, the courts increasingly were permitting firms to 
liquidate and reorganize in order to bypass recalcitrant shareholders (Carney 1980). 
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performance to stockholders, let alone publish balance sheets or profit and loss statements. 
Stockholders generally retained a common-law right to examine their enterprise’s books, but this 
right was difficult and expensive to exercise.  Moreover, it did not extend to those trying to 
decide whether or not to buy a firm’s stock.  Not until the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the 1930s was there much in the way of government protection for 
external investors, but even then the only shareholders who benefited were those putting their 
money into corporations whose securities were traded publicly (Kuhn 1912; Dodd 1936; Cadman 
1949; Gower 1956; Hawkins 1986; Baskin and Miranti 1997). 
The plight of minority investors in small- or medium-sized firms received scant attention 
until the New York legislature responded in the late 1940s to the Benintendi decision by passing 
a law allowing stockholders in close corporations to set high voting and quorum requirements for 
corporate decisions (O’Neal 1978, 874). Other states, however, were much slower to take action. 
North Carolina imbedded several provisions in its 1955 Business Corporation Act that were 
aimed specifically at small, closely held firms, including one declaring that agreements among 
all the shareholders of such corporations shall not, regardless of their form or purpose, “be 
invalidated on the ground that [their] effect is to make the parties partners among themselves” 
(O’Neil 1965).  A few other states passed similar statutes over the next decade or so, after which 
the trickle finally became a torrent.  Around the same time states also began to pass new laws 
that defined and established legal remedies for “corporate oppression” and other similar torts 
(Hillman 1982; Dickinson 1984; Mitchell 1990).  
During the late 1980s, moreover, states took steps to increase the menu of organizational 
choices.  A first wave of statutes made possible the formation of Limited Liability Companies 
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(LLCs) along the lines of the French SARLs;19 a second added the option of Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs), making it possible for every member of an ordinary partnership to limit 
their liability for the firm’s future debts simply by filing appropriate notice (Bishop 1995; 
Ribstein 1996; Stover and Hamill 1999; Banoff 2002). Although these changes owed more than 
anything else to attempts by firms to reduce their increasingly burdensome income tax liabilities, 
the result was to expand in a sudden and dramatic way the contractual freedom of business 
people in the U.S. By the start of the twenty-first century, firms could both secure limited 
liability for all their members and choose among a broad range of governance structures—much 
as their French counterparts had been able to do since the mid nineteenth century. 
Does Legal Regime Matter? 
Except for its reluctance to charter corporations before 1867, there is no evidence that the 
centralized French state operated as more of a constraint on businesses’ organizational choices 
than the decentralized American state.  To the contrary, until recently French business people 
had a broader menu of organizational forms from which to choose than their U.S. counterparts.  
They also had much more ability to modify the basic forms to suit their needs.  Although the 
                                                 
19 A few states had earlier passed legislation to enable business people to form limited liability associations. In 1874, 
for example, Pennsylvania passed a law providing for the creation of a new form of enterprise called the limited 
partnership association.  Michigan followed suit in 1877, New Jersey in 1880, and Ohio in 1881, but the device did 
not spread beyond these four, heavily industrial states. Moreover, even in these states the form was rarely adopted, 
most likely because the governance structure dictated by the legislation was highly restrictive. The statutes vested 
the power to incur debts in a board that had to consist of at least three managers elected by the members of the firm.  
Debts in excess of $500 required the signature of at least two managers, and there were situations in which the prior 
approval of a majority of the members was required before the managers could take action.  Approval of a majority 
was also necessary for the transfer of shares to new members (even from decedents to heirs) and for the acquisition 
of additional shares by an existing member (Schwartz 1965; Gazur and Giff 1991). 
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trend in the U.S. was toward greater contractual freedom over time, the common law played little 
role in this evolution.  Rather, in both countries, change came primarily through the passage of 
new statutes.  In some periods and for some purposes, U.S. statutes were more advantageous 
than the French, but in other periods and for other purposes, French statutes had the edge.  
Moreover, the trend over time was for U.S. law to converge toward the French model of 
organizational choice rather than the reverse. 
Before we succumb to the temptation to trumpet the advantages of the French legal 
regime over the Anglo-American system, it is instructive briefly to add the case of Great Britain 
to the comparison.  In some ways the situation facing British businesses in the nineteenth century 
was similar to that of firms in the U.S.  For example, in both countries the partnership form was 
governed by the common law.  Moreover, if anything, the law of partnership in Britain was more 
unchanging and inflexible.  Not only was there little evolution in the basic legal rules governing 
partnerships, but the weight of precedent blocked the introduction of the limited partnership form 
in Britain even more effectively than it did in the U.S. (Gower 1953 and 1956; Harris 2000).   
After Parliament passed a series of progressively more liberal general incorporation acts 
in 1844, 1855, and 1856, firms in Britain could organize freely as corporations, just as they could 
in the United States.  However, corporate law in Britain, like that in France, granted companies a 
great deal of freedom to structure their governance rules to meet the needs of their members.  
British company law included a model set of governance rules that was similar to the American 
standard of one-vote-per-share majority rule.  But the law permitted businesses to deviate from 
this model by writing alternative provisions into their articles of association.  Further, in 1907 
(even earlier than in France), Parliament passed a statute permitting firms to organize as limited 
liability companies similar to the German GmbH (Gower 1953 and 1956).   
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This brief comparison adds support to the argument we have developed in this article: 
that the common-law did not evolve flexibly in accordance with businesses’ needs, and that such 
changes as occurred over time in the menu of organizational forms and in the degree of 
contractual freedom available to businesses owed mainly to the passage of new statutes.  It also 
suggests that the pace and form of these statutory changes did not correspond in any readily 
apparent fashion with the type of legal regime in effect in the country.  Britain, like the U.S., was 
a common-law country, yet where organizational choices were governed by statute, British 
practice looked more like that of France than the U.S.  
How then can we understand the recent spate of cross-country regressions that associate 
the French legal regime with poor economic performance?  There are several possibilities.  One 
is that the significance of the variable for legal regime is a statistical artifact that might disappear 
(or even reverse sign) when the model is properly specified and omitted variables are included 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003).  A second is 
that the French legal system may have functioned very differently in core countries like France 
than in nations on the economic periphery (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2002; Berkowitz, 
Pistor, and Richard 2003).  Yet a third possibility is that the greater contractual freedom that 
businesses exercised under the French code was somehow a bad thing for economic 
development, perhaps because it increased the uncertainty that investors or creditors faced about 
the nature of the businesses seeking their funds.  To hold this view, however, one would have to 
believe that government policies that severely restricted the freedom of private parties to contract 
were prerequisites for economic success—a position that would seem to be directly counter to 
spirit that inspired this literature in the first place. 
 30
References 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development:  An Empirical Investigation.”  American Economic Review, 
91 (Dec. 2001), pp. 1369-1401. 
Atack, Jeremy, and Fred Bateman. “Preliminary Data on the Spread of Organizational Forms 
Among American Manufacturing Firms in the Nineteenth Century.” Unpublished paper, 
1995. 
Banoff, Barbara Ann. “Company Governance Under Florida’s Limited Liability Company Act.” 
Florida State University Law Review, 30 (Fall 2002), pp. 53-80. 
Baskin, Jonathon Barron, and Paul J. Miranti, Jr. A History of Corporate Finance. New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine.  “Legal Institutions and Financial Development.”  NBER 
Working Paper 10126 (2003). 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine.  “Law and Finance:  Why Does Legal 
Origin Matter?” Unpublished paper, 2002. 
_____.  “Law, Endowments, and Finance.” Journal of Financial Economics, 69 (2003), 
forthcoming. 
Berkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard. “Economic Development, 
Legality and the Transplant Effect.” European Economic Review, 47 (Feb. 2003), pp. 
165-95. 
Berle, Adolf A., Jr., and Gardiner C. Means.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  
New York:  Macmillan, 1933. 
 31
Bishop, Carter G. “Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations: Limited Liability 
Companies and Partnerships.”  Suffolk University Law Review, 29 (Winter 1995), pp. 
985-1058. 
Blair, Margaret M. “Locking in Capital:  What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers 
in the 19th Century.” UCLA Law Review, 52 (2004), forthcoming. 
Botero, Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer. “The Regulation of Labor.” Unpublished paper, 2002. 
Cadman, John W., Jr. The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-1875.  
Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 1949. 
Carlson, W. Bernard. “The Coordination of Business Organization and Technological Innovation 
within the Firm:  A Case Study of the Thomson-Houston Electric Company in the 
1880s.” In Coordination and Information:  Historical Perspectives on the Organization 
of Enterprise, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff.  Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. 55-94. 
Cary, William L.  “How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages:  Planning for 
the Closely Held Firm.” Northwestern University Law Review, 48 (1953), pp. 427-41. 
Carney, William J. “Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business 
Purposes.” American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 1980 (Winter 1980), pp. 69-132. 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1890). 
Compte général de l’administration de la Justice Civile et Commerciale.  Paris: imprimerie 
nationale, 1840-1913. 
 32
Copper-Royer, Édouard.  Traité théorique et pratique des sociétés anonymes:  suivi de formules 
annotées concernant les actes de la vie sociale.  3 vols.  3rd edn.; Paris:  Marchal et 
Godde, 1925. 
Dickinson, Kelvin H. “Partners in a Corporate Cloak:  The Emergence and Legitimacy of the 
Incorporated Partnership.” American University Law Review, 33 (Spring 1984), pp. 559-
600. 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. “Courts.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (May 2003), pp. 453-517. 
Dodd, Edwin Merrick.  American Business Corporations until 1860:  With Special Reference to 
Massachusetts.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. 
Dodd, E. Merrick, Jr. “Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936.” 
Harvard Law Review, 50 (Nov 1936), pp. 27-59. 
Dunlavy, Colleen A.  “From Citizens to Plutocrats:  Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting 
Rights and Theories of the Corporation.” In Crossing Corporate Boundaries:  History, 
Politics, and Culture, ed. Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia. New York:  Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming 2004. 
Evans, George Heberton, Jr. Business Incorporations in the United States, 1800-1943. New 
York:  National Bureau of Economic Research, 1948. 
Forbes, Kevin F.  “Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation.”  
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 163-77. 
Freedeman, Charles E.  Joint-Stock Enterprise in France, 1807-1867:  From Privileged 
Company to Modern Corporation.  Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 
1979. 
 33
_____.  The Triumph of Corporate Capitalism in France, 1867-1914.  Rochester, NY:  
University of Rochester Press, 1993. 
Freund, Ernst.  “The Legal Nature of Corporation.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 
1896. 
Gazette des tribunaux:  Journal de Jurisprudence et des débats judiciares. Paris: 1832-1843. 
Gazur, Wayne M., and Neil M. Goff. “Assessing the Limited Liability Company.”  Case Western 
Reserve Law Review, 41 (1991), pp. 387-501. 
Gilmore, Eugene Allen.  Handbook on the Law of Partnerships.  St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing, 1911. 
Glaeser, Edward L., and Andrei Shleifer.  “Legal Origins.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 
(Nov. 2002), pp. 1193-229. 
Glendon, Mary Ann, Michael W. Gordon, and Paolo G. Carozza.  Comparative Legal Traditions 
in a Nutshell.  2nd edn.; St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1999. 
Gower, L. C. B.  “The English Private Company.” Law and Contemporary Problems, 18 
(Autumn 1953), pp. 534-45. 
Gower, L. C. B. “Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law.” Harvard 
Law Review, 69 (June 1956), pp. 1369-1402. 
Handlin, Oscar, and Mary Flug Handlin.  “Origins of the American Business Corporation.” 
Journal of Economic History, 5 (May 1945), pp. 1-23. 
Harris, Ron.  Industrializing English Law:  Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-
1844.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille.  “Le marché boursier et le financement des entreprises françaises, 
1890-1939.” Thèse de doctorat, Paris Sorbonne, 1994. 
 34
Hawkins, David F. “The Development of Modern Financial Reporting Practices among 
American Manufacturing Corporations.” In Managing Big Business:  Essays from the 
Business History Review, ed. Richard S. Tedlow and Richard R. John, Jr. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1986.  Pp. 166-169.  
Hayek, Friedrich A.  The Constitution of Liberty.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
Hetherington, J.A.C., and Michael P. Dooley. “Illiquidity and Exploitation:  A Proposed 
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem.” Virginia Law Review, 
63 (Feb. 1977), pp. 1-62. 
Hillman, Robert W. “The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture:  A 
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations.” 
Minnesota Law Review, 67 (Oct. 1982), pp. 1-88. 
Horn, Norbert, Hein Kötz, and Hans G. Leser. German Private and Commercial Law:  An 
Introduction, trans. Tony Weir. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982. 
Hornstein, George D.  “Stockholders’ Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation.” Yale Law 
Journal, 59 (May 1950), pp. 1040-56. 
_____.   “Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership.” Law and Contemporary Problems, 
18 (Autumn 1953), pp. 435-50. 
Horwitz, Morton J.  The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960:  The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Houpin, C., and H. Bosvieux.  Traité général, théorique et pratique des sociétés civiles et 
commerciales et des associations, avec formules. 2 vols. Paris: Administration du Journal 
des notaires et des avocats, 1935. 
 35
Howard, Stanley E. “Business Partnerships in France Before 1807.” Accounting Review, 7 (Dec. 
1932), pp. 242-57. 
_____.  “The Limited Partnership in New Jersey.” Journal of Business of the University of 
Chicago, 7 (Oct. 1934), pp. 296-317. 
Hurst, James Willard. The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United 
States, 1780-1970. Charlottesville:  University of Virginia Press, 1970. 
Hurst, Thomas R. “Will the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994) Ever Be Uniformly 
Adopted?” Florida Law Review, 46 (Sept. 1996), pp. 575-89. 
Kessler, William C.  “Incorporation in New England:  A Statistical Study, 1800-1875.” Journal 
of Economic History, 8 (May 1948), pp. 43-62. 
Kuhn, Arthur K. A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations with Particular Reference to 
the Protection of Creditors and Shareholders. New York, 1912. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. “Constructing Firms:  Partnerships and Alternative Contractual 
Arrangements in Early-Nineteenth-Century American Business.” Business and Economic 
History, 24 (Winter 1995), pp. 43-71. 
_____. “Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. History:  An 
Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture.” In Crossing Corporate Boundaries:  History, 
Politics, and Culture, ed. Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia. New York:  Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming 2004. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance.” Journal of Finance, 52 (July 1997), pp. 1131-50. 
_____.  “Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy, 106 (Dec. 1998), pp. 1113-55. 
 36
_____.  “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 
(March 1999), pp. 222-79. 
_____. “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.” Journal of Financial Economics, 58 
(2000), pp. 3-27. 
Lefebvre-Teillard, Anne. La société anonyme au XIXe siècle: du Code de commerce à la loi de 
1867, histoire d'un instrument juridique du développement capitaliste.  Paris:  Presses 
universitaires de France, 1985. 
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck. “Financial Intermediation and Growth:  
Causality and Causes.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 46 (Aug. 2000), pp. 31-77. 
Lewis, William Draper. “The Uniform Partnership Act—A Reply to Mr. Crane’s Criticism.” 
Harvard Law Review, 29 (Dec. 1915), pp. 158-92. 
_____.  “The Uniform Limited Partnership Act.”  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 65 
(June 1917), pp. 715-31. 
Livermore, Shaw.  “Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 43 (Oct. 1935), pp. 674-87. 
Lyon-Cahen, Ch., and L. Renault.  Manuel de droit commercial.  Paris: Librairie Générale de 
Droit et Jurisprudence, 1924.  
Mahoney, Paul G.  “The Common Law and Economic Growth:  Hayek Might be Right.”  
Journal of Legal Studies, 30 (June 2001), pp. 503-25. 
Maier, Pauline. “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation.” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 50 (Jan. 1993), pp. 51-84. 
Martin, Joseph G. A Century of Finance:  Martin's History of the Boston Stock and Money 
Markets. Boston, 1898 [privately printed]. 
 37
McGuire, Patrick, Mark Granovetter, and Michael Schwartz. “Thomas Edison and the Social 
Construction of the Early Electricity Industry in America.” In Explorations in Economic 
Sociology, ed. Richard Swedberg. New York:  Russell Sage Foundation, 1993. Pp. 213-
46. 
Merle, Philippe. Droit Commercial: Societés Commerciales. 6th edn., Paris: Dalloz, 1998.  
Merryman, John Henry. “The French Deviation.”  American Journal of Comparative Law, 44 
(Winter 1996), pp. 109-19. 
Mitchell, Lawrence E. “The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 138 (June 1990), pp. 1675-31. 
Moll, Douglas K.  “Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question  
of Perspective.”  Vanderbilt Law Review, 53 (April 2000), pp. 749-827. 
Navin, Thomas R., and Marian V. Sears. “The Rise of a Market for Industrial Stocks, 1887-
1902.” Business History Review, 29 (June 1955), pp. 105-38. 
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. “Constitutions and Commitment:  The Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of 
Economic History, 49 (Dec. 1989), pp. 803-32. 
O’Neal, F. Hodge.  “Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions:  Use of Special 
Charter and By-Law Provisions.” Law and Contemporary Problems, 18 (Autumn 1953), 
pp. 451-72. 
O’Neal, F. Hodge.  Close Corporations:  Law and Practice.  Chicago:  Callaghan & Co., 1958.  
2 vols. 
_____.  “Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation.”  Cornell Law Quarterly, 50 
(Summer 1965), pp. 641-62. 
 38
O’Neal, F. Hodge. “Close Corporations:  Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform.” The 
Business Lawyer, 33 (Jan. 1978), pp. 873-88. 
Perkins, Edwin J.  American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815.  Columbus:  
Ohio State University Press, 1994. 
Plache, Lacey.  “Financial Institutions, Government Policy and Industrialization:  The 
Development of the French Stock Market, 1852-1875.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1999. 
Posner, Richard A.  Economic Analysis of the Law.  Boston, Mass.:  Little-Brown, 1973. 
Pound, Roscoe. The Spirit of the Common Law.  Boston, Mass.:  Marshall Jones, 1921. 
Priest, George L. “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules.” Journal of 
Legal Studies, 6 (Jan. 1977), pp. 65-82. 
Ribstein, Larry E.  “Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms.” University of Cincinnati Law 
Review, 64 (Winter 1996), pp. 319-68. 
Ripert, Georges  Traité élémentaire de droit commercial. Paris : Librairie Générale de Droit et 
Jurisprudence, 1968. 
Rivière, H. F.  Répétitions écrites sur le code de Commerce. 8th edn.; Paris:  A. Maresq, 1882. 
Rock, Edward B., and Michael L. Wachter. “Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific 
Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations.” In Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership, ed. Randall K. Morck. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2000. Pp. 201-
42. 
Rubin, Paul H.  “Why is the Common Law Efficient?” Journal of Legal Studies, 6  (Jan. 1977), 
pp. 51-63. 
 39
Rutledge, Wiley B., Jr. “Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes.” Washington 
University Law Review, 22 (April 1937), pp. 305-43. 
Schwartz, Edward R.  “The Limited Partnership Association—An Alternative to the Corporation 
for the Small Business with ‘Control’ Problems?”  Rutgers Law Review, 20 (1965), pp. 
29-88. 
Stone, Harlan F.  “The Common Law in the United States.”  Harvard Law Review, 50 (Nov. 
1936), pp. 4-26. 
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, as a Branch of Commercial and 
Maritime Jurisprudence with Occasional Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law. 
5th edn.; Boston:  Little, Brown, 1859. 
Stover, Fallany O., and Susan Pace Hamill.  “The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for 
Businesses Contemplating the Choice.”  Alabama Law Review, 50 (Spring 1999), pp. 
813-47. 
U.S., Census Office. Twelfth Census:  Manufacturers. Washington, DC:  U.S. Census Office, 
1902, Vol. 7. 
U.S., Internal Revenue Service. Statistics of Income—1920.  Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1922. 
U.S., Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income—1976:  Business Income Tax Return.  
Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1979.  
Warren, Edward H.  Corporate Advantages without Incorporation.  New York:  Baker, Voorhis 
& Co., 1929. 
Watson, Alan., Legal Transplants:  An Approach to Comparative Law. Edinburgh, Scottish 
Academic Press,1974. 
 40
Weber, Max.  On Law in Economy and Society, ed. Max Rheinstein and trans. Edward Shils and 
Rheinstein.  Trans. of 1925 edn; Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1954. 
Woodward, Susan E.  “Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm.”  Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 141 (Dec. 1985), pp. 601-11. 
Zwiegart, Konrad, and Hein Kötz.  Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony Weir.  3rd edn., 
rev.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
 41
 
Table 1 
 
Availability of the Basic Forms of Organization  
in the United States and France  
 
 
  Available in 
Type of form Definition of form U.S.? France? 
    
Ordinary partnership 
(société en nom 
collectif) 
Two or more partners, all 
unlimitedly liable 
Yes Yes 
    
    
Limited partnership 
(commandite simple) 
One or more general partners with 
unlimited liability and one or more 
special partners who cannot 
participate in management but who 
have limited liability 
Yes, but 
provisions 
less 
attractive 
Yes 
    
    
Limited partnership with 
shares (commandite par 
action) 
Same as above, except special 
partners’ shares can be bought and 
sold 
No Yes 
    
    
Limited liability 
company (société à 
responsabilité limitée) 
All members have limited liability, 
but their shares are not tradable 
Not until the 
late 1980s 
After 
1925 
    
 
Corporation (société 
anonyme) 
 
All members have unlimited 
liability and their shares are tradable 
 
Yes after  
c1850, 
increasingly 
before then 
 
Yes 
after 
1867, 
limited 
before 
then 
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Table 2 
 
Restrictions on the Activities of Members of Ordinary Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Partners 
 
 
Firm 
Cannot 
Borrow 
Joint 
Signature 
Required to 
Encumber 
the Firm 
 
 
 
Delegated 
Management
 
 
Partnerships 
Without 
Restrictions 
 
 
 
 
Total 
      
  Number of Firms  
      
 2  238  905  755  1847  3617 
      
 3  61  180  305  228  685 
      
 4  31  31  104  42  168 
      
 >4  18  20  65  6  73 
      
Total  277  982  971  1872  3879 
      
  Percentage of Row Total  
      
 2 6.6 25.0 20.9 51.1  
      
 3 8.9 26.3 44.5 33.3  
      
 4 18.5 18.5 61.9 25.0  
      
 >4 22.8 25.3 82.3 7.6  
      
Total 7.7 25.0 27.0 46.7  
      
 
Source: Notices of new firms published in the Gazette des tribunaux from 1 January 1832 
through 31 December 1843. 
 
Note: “Cannot borrow” refers to partnership contracts that required all business to be on a cash 
basis. “Joint signature” contracts required more than one partner (though not necessarily all) to 
sign any debt instrument.  “Delegated management” contracts gave a subset of partners the right 
to manage the firm on a day-to-day basis and could occur with either (or none) of the previous 
clauses. “Without restrictions” means that each partner had full ownership rights. 
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Table 3 
 
Restrictions on the Activities of General Partners in Commandites Simples 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
General 
Partners 
 
 
Firm 
Cannot 
Borrow 
Joint 
Signature 
Required to 
Encumber 
the Firm 
 
 
 
Delegated 
Management
 
 
Partnerships 
Without 
Restrictions 
 
 
 
 
Total 
      
  Number of Firms  
      
 1  113  --  --  642  755 
      
 2  37  38  72  213  347 
      
 3  5  9  16  25  50 
      
 >3  3  2  10  3  15 
      
Total  158  49  98  806  1081 
      
  Percentage of Row Total—All Firms  
      
  13.0  4.7  8.4  76.0  
      
 Percentage of Row Total—Firms With More Than One General Partner 
      
  10.1  11.8  23.7  58.3  
      
 
Sources and Notes: See Table 2.
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Table 4 
 
Restrictions on the Activities of General Partners in Commandites par Action 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
General 
Partners 
 
 
Firm 
Cannot 
Borrow 
Joint 
Signature 
Required to 
Encumber 
the Firm 
 
 
 
Delegated 
Management
 
 
Partnerships 
Without 
Restrictions 
 
 
 
 
Total 
      
  Number of Firms  
      
 1  262  9  --  869  1142 
      
 2  87  48 117  204  429 
      
 >2  42  41  85  48  170 
      
Total  391  98  203  1121  1740 
      
  Percentage of Row Total—All Firms  
      
  22.5  5.6  11.6  64.4  
      
 Percentage of Row Total—Firms With More Than One General Partner 
      
  21.5  14.9  33.7  42.1  
      
 
Sources and Notes: See Table 2. 
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Figure 1: Distributions of New Multi-Owner Firms in France 
1840-1913
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
18
40
18
43
18
46
18
49
18
52
18
55
18
58
18
61
18
64
18
67
18
70
18
73
18
76
18
79
18
82
18
85
18
88
18
91
18
94
18
97
19
00
19
03
19
06
19
09
19
12
Cooperatives and others
Corporations
Share Commandites
Commandites Simples
Partnerships
 
 
Source: Annual issues of the Compte général de l’administration de la justice civile et 
commerciale. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of New Multiowner Firms in France 1919-1980
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